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I. Introduction
Establishing what property of the debtor will pass into the bankruptcy estate is critical to
effectuating the dual purposes of the Bankruptcy Code: to grant the debtor a fresh start and to divide
assets of the estate equitably among creditors. In a chapter 7 proceeding, this threshold
determination divides the debtor’s assets into those that the debtor will retain and those that will be
liquidated to satisfy creditors’ claims.
In determining what is property of the estate, an issue arises when before filing for
bankruptcy, the debtor files a return for a pre-petition tax year and elects to apply a refund toward her
petition year’s tax liability. Assuming the refund was property of the estate, how does the debtor’s
election, which is irrevocable under the Tax Code, affect the nature of the debtor’s property interest?
If the debtor retained an interest, then the refund is property of the estate under section 541 of the
Bankruptcy Code and is subject to turnover under section 542 of the Code. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541–
542 (2006).
Recently, in Nichols v. Birdsell, 491 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit confronted
this issue and determined that the debtor’s irrevocable election to apply a tax refund as a credit for
the following tax year was not a bar to the bankruptcy trustee’s turnover claim. Other courts that
have encountered this issue have reached a different result.
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Part II of this memo details the Bankruptcy Code’s provisions relevant in determining what
property belongs to the estate. Part III discusses case law from courts that have confronted the issue
of a chapter 7 debtor’s election to apply a pre-petition tax refund toward the petition tax year and
illustrates that courts have adopted three different approaches in adjudicating the issue. Part IV
explores the policy considerations involved in these three approaches. The memo concludes that
regardless of the approach selected, the bankruptcy court must consider the competing interests of
creditors and debtors.
II. Relevant Bankruptcy Code Provisions
A. Property of the Estate – Section 541
Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code defines what constitutes property of the estate and has
been described by commentators as the heart of the Code. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 541, at
541-8.1 (Alan N. Resnick et.al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 2006); 4 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
PRACTICE § 61, at 61-2 (William L. Norton, Jr. ed., 3d ed. 2007). The reach of section 541 is broad:
“all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the estate.” 11
U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2006). The estate consists of such property of the debtor “wherever located and
by whomever held.” Id.
To promote equitable distribution to creditors, courts liberally have construed “property of
the estate.” See Wright v. IRS (In re Canon), 130 B.R. 748, 750 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991). The
Supreme Court has indicated that “an interest is not outside [the estate’s] reach because [the interest]
is novel or contingent or because enjoyment must be postponed.” Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375,
379 (1966). Moreover, Congress provided in section 541(c)(1)(A) that “an interest of the debtor in
property becomes property of the estate . . . notwithstanding any provision in an agreement, transfer
instrument, or applicable nonbankruptcy law– that restricts or conditions transfer of such interest by
the debtor.” The estate’s interests are limited, however, to those held by the debtor at the filing of the
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petition. The estate’s interests are neither expanded nor restricted beyond what the debtor might
have claimed at the case’s commencement. See Grant v. United States (In re Simmons), 124 B.R.
606, 607 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991).
B. Turnover of Property of the Estate – Section 542
[A]n entity . . . in possession, custody, or control, during the case, of property that the
trustee may use, sell, or lease under section 363 of this title . . . shall deliver to the
trustee, and account for, such property or the value of such property, unless such
property is of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a).

Under section 542, the trustee is empowered to make demand of any entity, including the debtor
herself, to turnover property that the trustee believes is of value and belongs to the estate. See
Appellant v. Graves (In re Graves), 396 B.R. 71, 73 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2008); Traina v. Orrill (In
re Orrill), 226 B.R. 563, 565 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1997). The scope of section 542 is not restricted
to property that can be physically transferred to the trustee. The statute also provides that the
value of the property may be transferred to the trustee. See Birdsell v. Nichols (In re Nichols),
309 B.R. 41, 45 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2004).
III. The Effect on Debtor’s Interest in Tax Refund of Prebankruptcy Election to Apply Tax
Refund for Pre-Petition Tax Year to Petition Year Tax Liability
A. Preliminary Note
Even before the passage of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code revisions, the Supreme Court
established that a tax refund could be property of the estate. See Barowsky v. Serelson (In re
Barowsky), 946 F.2d 1516, 1517 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 648
(1974)). The Court held that a tax refund was “sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past and so
little entangled with the bankrupt’s ability to make an unencumbered fresh start that it should be
regarded as ‘property.’ ” Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 647 (1974) (quoting Segal, 382 U.S. at
380). Thus, the issue presented is not whether a tax refund is property of the estate, but whether the
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nature of the debtor’s interest in a pre-petition tax year refund is changed by the debtor’s irrevocable
election to apply the refund toward her petition tax year liability.
B. Decisions Where the Court Ruled the Refund Was the Property of the Estate
1. Nichols v. Birdsell, 491 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2007)
In Nichols, the debtors filed their 2001 tax return two weeks before filing their chapter 7
petition and, pursuant to sections 6402(b) and 6513(d) of the Tax Code, irrevocably elected to apply
their anticipated refund to the 2002 tax year. The following year, the debtors used almost all of the
2001 credit to satisfy their 2002 income tax obligation. The trustee instituted the suit against the
debtors to recover the 2001 overpayment under section 542(a). See In re Nichols, 309 B.R. at 42–43.
The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to the trustee, holding that the debtors must deliver
to the trustee the value of the 2001 refund. Id. at 46.
On their appeal, the debtors argued that the election had changed the character of the
overpayment; however, the Ninth Circuit viewed the election as merely delaying the liquidation of
the asset or preventing its transfer, neither of which, said the court, would prevent the overpayment
from becoming property of the estate. See Nichols, 491 F.3d at 989–90. The circuit court found that
after the debtors’ election, they retained a credit with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) for which
they were “provided a dollar-for-dollar tax reduction in the following year” and, absent the debtors’
election, the overpayment would likely have been available to the estate at the filing of the petition.
Id. at 990. The court indicated that the debtors’ election was of no moment in the analysis, holding
that the credit was property of the estate and either the credit or its value was subject to turnover
under section 542. Id.
2. Wright v. IRS (In re Canon), 130 B.R. 748 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991)
In In re Canon, the debtor filed his 1987 tax return in March 1989 and realized a refund of
$14,900, which he irrevocably elected, pursuant section 6513(d) of the Tax Code, to apply to his
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1988 tax liability. In re Canon, 130 B.R. at 749. In June, the debtor filed for chapter 7 protection.
On his 1989 return, the debtor’s withholding satisfied his tax liability and he received a refund for the
$14,900 overpayment. Id. The trustee sought the overpayment from the IRS under section 542. The
parties cross moved for summary judgment and the court, granting the trustee’s motion, ordered the
IRS to turnover the $14,900 overpayment. Id. at 753.
Discussing the legislative history of section 541, the court indicated that Congress intended
“property of the estate” to be interpreted broadly. The court found that, at the time of the debtor’s
petition and in spite of his election on his 1987 return, the debtor retained “the right to a refund of
any overpayment which might arise by computation of his 1988 tax return.” Id. at 751. Citing the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Segal, the court indicated that the debtor’s right to this possible
overpayment became property of the estate “even though it was a contingent asset which could not
be enjoyed until the close of the 1988 tax year.” Id. Because the debtor then realized an
overpayment on his 1988 tax return, the trustee was able to seek turnover of the 1988 tax refund. Id.
at 753. Like the Nichols court, the Canon court found that the debtor’s irrevocable election did not
fundamentally alter the character of the debtor’s interest in the tax refund such that it placed the asset
beyond the scope of sections 541 and 542.
C. Decisions Where the Court Ruled the Refund Was Not the Property of the Estate
1. United States v. Pritchard (In re Block), 141 B.R. 609 (N.D. Tex. 1992)
Almost a year after the In re Canon case was heard in the bankruptcy court, the District Court
for the Northern District of Texas, in In re Block, reached the opposite conclusion regarding the
nature of the debtor’s interest in a tax overpayment that had been irrevocably elected pursuant to
section 6513(d) of the Tax Code. In filing their 1988 amended return, the debtors elected to apply
their $11,807 overpayment to the 1989 tax year. Two days later, the debtors filed for chapter 7 relief.
The trustee sought to compel turnover of the refund under section 542. Faced with cross motions for
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summary judgment, the bankruptcy court granted the motion of the trustee. The district court,
reversing the bankruptcy court, held that after the debtors’ election:
[debtors] no longer had an overpayment for which they could file a claim for refund;
the overpayment became an advance payment of the [debtors’] 1989 taxes.
Consequently, their “prepetition estimated tax payment cannot be considered a legal
or equitable interest of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case,
and such payment is not subject to turnover.” United States v. Pritchard (In re Block),
141 B.R. 609, 611 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (quoting In re Simmons, 124 B.R. at 607–08).
The district court distinguished the Supreme Court’s holdings in Kokoszka and Segal, noting
that, at the time of the filings in those cases, the debtors had a right to payment of their respective
income tax refunds. The court stated that, in the case at bar, no such right could transfer to the estate
because the debtors no longer held an interest in receiving a refund. Thus, the overpayment was
found not to be property of the estate under section 541 and ineligible for turnover under section 542.
Id. at 611.
2. Morton v. IRS (In re Metcalf), No. 00-10279-7, 2001 WL 1203344 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
Aug. 17, 2001)
Ten years later, the Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District of Texas again faced the issue
of a debtor’s irrevocable election to apply a pre-petition tax refund as a credit for the petition tax
year. This time the court, following In re Block, held that the election, once made, removed the
overpayment from the scope of sections 541 and 542. The debtor filed her 1999 tax return in March
2000 and claimed an overpayment of $5,537. On her return, she elected to apply the overpayment to
the 2000 tax year. One month later, she filed for chapter 7 protection. The trustee sought return of
the 1999 overpayment from the IRS by filing an amended return seeking to overturn the debtor’s
election. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment and the court entered judgment against the
trustee. The court found that “once the overpayment [was] properly transferred to the IRS prepetition, it [could not] become property of the estate, and [was] not recoverable under [section] 542.”
In re Metcalf, 2001 WL 1203344, at *2.
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3. Grant v. United States (In re Simmons), 124 B.R. 606 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991)
Six months prior to the In re Canon case, the Bankruptcy Court of the Middle District of
Florida faced the issue and held that the debtor, in making the irrevocable election to apply his tax
overpayment to the following tax year, lost all claim to the refund and, thus, maintained no legal or
equitable interest in the overpayment. The overpayment was not available for turnover. The debtor
had filled his 1987 tax return on March 18, 1988 and then filed for chapter 7 protection less than a
week later. On his 1987 return, he elected to have his $7,799 overpayment applied toward the 1988
tax year. See In re Simmons, 124 B.R. at 607.
The court noted that the trustee “[could not] recover an authorized pre-payment of taxes
simply because it originated pre-petition.” Id. at 608. This included those pre-petition payments
made by withholding from the debtor’s wages, an estimated tax payment made under section 6654 of
the Tax Code, and any tax overpayment from one tax year elected forward to the following tax year.
The court held that the tax overpayment sought by the trustee had been “properly transferred to the
United States . . . and [was] not property of the estate.” Id. at 608.
D. A Middle Ground
1. Traina v. Orrill (In re Orrill), 226 B.R. 563 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1997)
The In re Orrill court struck a middle ground when it disallowed the trustee’s turnover claim
to the debtor’s overpayment for the pre-petition tax year, but found that the subsequent year’s refund
was property of the estate to the extent that the refund was “attributable to the pre-petition period.” In
re Orrill, 226 B.R. at 566. The debtor filed his 1993 return on October 17, 1994. His return
indicated an anticipated refund of $14,121, of which the debtor elected to apply $9,993 to his 1994
tax liability. The next day, the debtor filed for chapter 7 protection. Upon filing his 1994 taxes, the
debtor was entitled to a refund of $1,795. Id. at 564.
Analogizing the case to In re Simmons and In re Block, the court found that the overpayment,
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as applied to the 1994 taxes, was not property of the estate as a matter of law. Id. at 566. The court
permitted, however, the trustee to recover that portion of the 1994 tax refund that was attributable to
the pre-petition portion of the year. Multiplying the 1994 refund by the proportion of the days prepetition to the total days in the calendar year, the court calculated that the trustee was entitled to
$1,426.80 and the debtor was able to retain $368.20. Id.
E. A Turnover Concern
1. Appellant v. Graves (In re Graves), 396 B.R. 71 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2008)
In In re Graves, the court assumed, without deciding, that the debtors’ overpayment was
property of the estate in order to focus its analysis more closely on section 542 as a method to obtain
a tax overpayment from the debtors. The court concluded that turnover under section 542 was not
appropriate as against the debtors. In re Graves, 396 B.R. at 75-76. The debtors filed their 2006 tax
return in July 2007 and claimed a refund of $3,000. On September 20, the debtors filed for chapter 7
protection. Id. at 72.
In analyzing the trustee’s turnover claim, the court noted that turnover under section 542 was
limited to “ ‘property that the trustee may use, sell or lease,’ and [was] in the turnover target’s
possession or control during the bankruptcy case.” In re Graves, 396 B.R. at 75 (quoting 11 U.S.C. §
542(a)). The court indicated that the debtors could not relinquish possession of funds held by the
IRS in which the debtors held only a contingent reversionary interest. The court summed up its
observations: “A trustee . . . can no more compel a debtor to turnover funds that he does not have
than he can squeeze blood out of a turnip.” Id. The court held that the debtors could not be
compelled to turnover the tax overpayment because they were not in possession, custody or control
of the funds sought by the trustee. Id. at 75–76.
IV. Policy Considerations
The case law presents three distinct approaches taken by the courts, each of which reflects a
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policy choice as to whose interests, debtors or creditors, should be paramount.
First, there are courts that favor creditors by holding that the entire tax overpayment from the
pre-petition tax year is subject to turnover. See Nichols, 491 F.3d 987. By subjecting the entire
overpayment to turnover, a court will maximize the amount available for distribution to creditors.
This pro-creditor approach, however, may impose a great financial hardship on chapter 7 debtors
who depend on the tax refund to pay their post-petition tax liability.
Second, there are courts that favor the debtor by holding that after the debtor’s election, the
debtor has no right to the tax overpayment, thus preventing the overpayment from entering the estate.
See In re Block, 141 B.R. 609. An asset withheld from the estate is generally left for the benefit of
the debtor in making her fresh start. This pro-debtor solution is arguably unfair to unsecured
creditors whose debts would likely be discharged, particularly as it is common in a chapter 7
proceeding for a tax refund to be one of the debtor’s largest non-exempt assets.
Third, there are courts that split the difference and attempt to balance the interests of creditors
and debtors. According to these courts, the debtor, at the time of the bankruptcy petition’s filing,
holds a contingent reversionary interest in any overpayment that results from the petition tax year.
See In re Canon, 130 B.R. 748. Thus, these courts allow the estate to collect any refund that results
from the subsequent tax year. A subset of this third group limits the potential refund to that portion
that is attributable to the pre-petition portion of the year. See In re Orrill, 226 B.R. 563.
It is this third approach that best suits the dual purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. The debtor
is ensured the best fresh start possible because the debtor retains the ability to use the tax
overpayment for her petition year tax liability. In the event, however, the debtor is able to cover her
tax liability via wage withholding and need not resort to use of the tax overpayment, the overpayment
is returned to the estate for distribution to creditors.
It may be argued that by allowing the debtor the first chance to use the overpayment, an
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ill-intentioned debtor may take advantage and prevent the estate access to a valuable asset that could
be used to benefit creditors. In that factual situation, however, the trustee could resort to section
548(a)(1) and void the election as a fraudulent transfer. Yet the trustee must be wary because the tax
overpayment allows the debtor to take a dollar for dollar credit, thus the trustee will need to argue
and prove the debtor’s actual intent to “hinder, delay or defraud.” See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006); cf. In
re Middendorf, 381 B.R. 774, 777–78 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008), In re Orrill, 226 B.R. at 564, In re
Simmons, 124 B.R. at 608.
V. Conclusion
Regardless of the approach taken by a court when confronted with a chapter 7 debtor who has
elected to apply a pre-petition tax refund to her petition year tax liability, the choice itself
demonstrates how a bankruptcy court must consider the dueling interests of creditors and debtors in
deciding the threshold issue of what property of the debtor is property of the estate.
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